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Preference cycles in stable matchings
Andrei Ciupan
Abstract. Consider the stable matching problem on two sets. We introduce
the concept of a preference cycle and show how its natural presence in stable
matchings proves a series of classical results in an elementary way.
1. Introduction
The problem of stable matchings has been studied by economists and applied
mathematicians since Gale and Shalpey’s original paper in 1962. This paper intro-
duces a structure linking agent preferences and stable matchings. The properties
of this structure provide quick and elementary proofs of many foundational results
in matching theory. We first introduce the concept of stable matchings, then cary
on to proving the results. Proofs of the relevant lemmas are in the appendix. We
start with one-to-one matchings and then move on to many-to-one matchings.
Consider two disjoint sets M and W where each agent a in one of the two sets
has a preference ranking of the agents of the other set, such that the ranking is
strict (i.e. there are no ties) and agent a prefers agent b to agent c if and only if
agent a’s ranking of b’s ranking is higher its ranking of c. Every agent also ranks
the outside option which we label ∅. This preference ranking induces a preference
relation ≻a for every agent. We say that a likes b if and only if b is prefered to the
outside option ∅, i.e. b ≻a ∅.
A one-to-one matching onM ∪W is a function µ :M ∪W 7→M ∪W ∪{∅} such
that µ(m) /∈ M if m ∈ M and µ(W ) /∈ W if w ∈ W , and µ(µ(a)) = a whenever
µ(a) 6= ∅. This simply means that we can consider µ as an assignment of pairs
(m,µ(m)) of between agents in M and W , with the option that some agents are
unmatched, i.e. their assignment through µ is the outside option ∅.
A one-to-one matching is individually rational if every agent a likes its assign-
ment whenever it’s assigned one, i.e. µ(a) ≻a ∅ whenever µ(a) 6= ∅.
Second, a pair (m,w) ∈M ×W is a blocking pair of µ if m prefers w to µ(m)
and w prefers m to µ(w). Coloquially we can interpret this as both m and w
prefering to be matched to each other than staying in the assignment defined by µ.
Finally, a one-to-one matching µ is stable if it is individually rational and has
no blocking pair.
We now define stable matching in the many-to-one case and then proceed with
the results.
Harvard University. aciupan@hbs.edu.
1
2 ANDREI CIUPAN
Consider two sets S and C. It convenient to consider S to be a set of students
and C a set of colleges, for simplicity and in order to quickly understand the notation
that follows. Each student s ∈ S has a preference ranking over colleges in C, and
the outside option, like in the one-to-one case. For college preferences we add a few
natural changed from the one-to-one case. Every college c ∈ C has a capacity qc
and has strict preferences over subsets of students in S and the outside option again
labeled ∅. Finally every college c ∈ C has the property that it prefers {c1} to {c2} if
and only if it prefers A∪{c1} to A∪{c2} for all c1, c2 ∈ C,A ⊂ C, c1 6= c2, c1, c2 6= A.
Such preferences are called responsive preferences.
A many-to-one matching µ on S ∪ C is a function µ : S ∪ C 7→ C ∪ 2S ∪ {∅}1
such that µ(s) ∈ C ∪ {∅} for all s ∈ S and µ(c) = {s ∈ S such that µ(s) = c} for
all c ∈ C. These properties simply guarantee the consistence of the assignment of
students to colleges, and it permits that multiple students be assigned to the same
college.
A many-to-one matching µ on S ∪ C is individually rational if every student
matched to a college prefers that assignment to the outside option, every college
prefers each of its assigned students to the outside options, and for every college
c ∈ C, the number of students it is assigned, |µ(c) is less than its capacity qc.
A pair (s, c) ∈ S × C is a blocking pair of µ if s prefers c to µ(c) and either c
prefers s to one of its assigned students µ(c), or c likes s and |µ(c)| < qc. We can
interpret this as both parties being better off if they get matched.
Finally, a many-to-one matching µ on S ∪ C is a stable matching if it is in-
dividually rational and there are no blocking pairs. We are now ready to proceed
with results.
2. One-to-one matching
We consider two disjoint sets M and W with strict preferences as described in
the introduction.
The deferred acceptance algorithm, the lone wolf theorem and the lattice struc-
ture of stable matchings and some of the fundamental results in matching theory.
We prove the former two of these results, along with a classical result by Roth.
The following definitions will be useful:
Definition 2.1. A preference cycle is an ordered list m0w0m1w1 . . .mkwkm0
of unique agents, alternating between M and W , such that each agent prefers its
succesor in the cycle to its predecessor.
Definition 2.2. Consider a matching µ. A preference cyclem0w0m1w1 . . .mkwkm0
is called (S, µ) - dominating if for all agents a ∈ S in the cycle, a’s successor in the
cycle is µ(a). A preference cycle is called (S, µ) - dominated if for all agents a ∈ S
in the cycle, a’s predecessor in the cycle is µ(a).
Note that by construction, if a preference cycle is (M,µ) dominating then it is
also (W,µ) dominated, and vice-versa.
We move on to our first result:
Lemma 2.3. Let µ and µ′ be two stable matchings on M ∪W with µ′(m) ≻m
µ(m) for somem ∈M . Then m is part of a preference cyclem0w0m1w1 . . .mkwkm0
which is (M,µ) dominated and (M,µ′) dominating.
1Here 2S represents the set of subsets of S
PREFERENCE CYCLES IN STABLE MATCHINGS 3
Proof. The proof is in the appendix.
Theorem 2.4. (McVitie-Wilson ’70) Let µ, µ′ be two stable matchings on M ∪
W . Then µ(a) = ∅ ⇐⇒ µ′(a) = ∅, for all a ∈M ∪W .
Proof. Assume that there exists an agent m ∈ M for which µ(m) = ∅ and
µ′(m) 6= 0. Then µ′(m) ≻m µ(m). Therefore, according to Lemma 2.3, m is part of
a (M,µ) dominated preference cycle, so in particular µ(m) ∈W , which constitutes
a contradiction. 
Theorem 2.5. (Conway ’76) Let µ, µ′ be two stable matchings on M ∪ W .
Then there exists a stable matching µ′′ which makes all agents in M weakly better
off than in µ or µ′, and all agents in W weakly worse off than in µ or µ′.
Proof. Consider the setsM ′ ⊆M andW ′ ⊆W of agents with different matches
in µ and µ′. According to Lemma 2.3, we can partition M ′ ∪W ′ into n disjoint
preference cycles
(
m
(i)
0 w
(i)
0 m
(i)
1 w
(i)
1 . . .m
(i)
ki
w
(i)
ki
m
(i)
0
)
1≤i≤n
, with each cycle being
either
{(M,µ) and (W,µ′) dominating } or {(W,µ) and (M,µ′) dominating }.
Consider the matching µ′′ defined as follows: ifm ∈M ′ then µ′′(m) is agentm’s
successor inm’s corresponding preference cycle. Otherwise µ′′(m) = µ(m) = µ′(m).
By construction, each agent in M is weakly better off under µ′′ and each agent
in W is weakly worse off under µ′′. Let’s show that µ′′ is stable. Clearly individual
rationality holds. Let’s also prove that there exists no blocking pair.
Assume that agent m ∈ M prefers w ∈ W to µ′′(m) and that w prefers m to
µ′′(w). Assume without loss of generality that µ′′(w) = µ(w). m strictly prefers
w to µ′′(m) and m weakly prefers µ′′(m) to µ(m). Therefore (m,w) is a blocking
pair for µ, which is a contradiction.
Therefore µ′′ is indeed stable. .
The following lemma will be useful for the subsequent theorem:
Lemma 2.6. Let µ and µ′ be two matchings on M ∪W such that µ is stable and
µ′(m) ≻m µ(m) for all m ∈ M . Then every agent m ∈ M is part of a preference
cycle that is both (M,µ) dominated and (M,µ′) dominating.
Proof. The proof is in the appendix.
Theorem 2.7. (Roth ’82) Let µ be the stable matching on M ∪W obtained
from the M - proposing deferred acceptance algorithm. Then there is no invidually
rational matching µ′ such that µ′(m) ≻m µ(m) for all m ∈M .
Proof. Assume the contrary. Then every agent m ∈ M is part of a preference
cycle that is (M,µ) dominated and (M,µ′) dominating. In particular, every agent
m ∈ M has µ(m) ∈ W . Consider an agent m ∈ M which was matched with
µ(m) = w in the last round of the deferred acceptance algorithm. Consider m’s
corresponding preference cycle. Since w is m’s predecessor in the cycle, w is an
element of the cycle, and also has a predecessor m1. w is m1’s successor in the
cycle. Since this cycle is (M,µ) dominated, m1 prefers w to µ(m1). Therefore
m1 proposed to w at some point, and eventually got rejected. Therefore, when m
proposed to w, w was holding another agent. Since this is the last round of the
algorithm, this agent is left with no match. This is a contradiction. 
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3. Many-to-one markets
We consider the many-to-one matching setup on sets S ∪ C of students and
colleges, as described in the introduction. The rural hospitals theorem and Pathak
and Sonmez’ 08 results are two fundamental results in this space, one classical and
one modern. We prove both of them with the preference cycles technique
The following definitions will be useful:
Definition 3.1. A preference cycle is an ordered list s0c0s1c1 . . . skcks0 of
unique agents alternating from S and C such that each agent prefers its succesor
in the cycle to its predecessor.
Definition 3.2. Consider a matching µ on S∪C. A preference cycle s0c0s1c1 . . . skcks0
of agents alternating between S and C is called (X,µ) dominated if one of the fol-
lowing two relations holds for all agents a ∈ X in the cycle:
(1) a ∈ S and agent a’s predecessor in the cycle is µ(a).
(2) a ∈ C and a’s predecessor in the cycle belongs to µ(a).
The analogous definition characterizes (X,µ) dominating preference cycles.
Note that a preference cycle is (S, µ) dominating if and only if it is (C, µ)
dominated, and vice-versa.
Let’s move on to our first result of this section:
Lemma 3.3. Let µ and µ′ be two stable matchings on S∪C, with µ′(s) ≻s µ(s)
for some s ∈ S. Then s is part of a preference cycle s0c0s1c1 . . . skcks0 which is
(S, µ) dominated, (S, µ′) dominating and all colleges in this cycle are filled at full
capacity in µ and µ′.
Proof. The proof is in the appendix
Theorem 3.4. (Rural Hospitals Theorem) Let µ, µ′ be two stable matchings in
a many-to-one market S ∪C. Then the following hold:
(1) For all s ∈ S, µ(s) = ∅ ⇐⇒ µ′(s) = ∅.
(2) For all c ∈ C, |µ(c)| = |µ′(c)|.
(3) If c ∈ C and µ(c) 6= qc (the college’s capacity), then µ(c) = µ
′(c).
Proof. We prove the results in order. First, assume without loss of generality
that µ′(s) ≻s µ(s) = ∅. We apply lemma 3.3 and get that s is a part of a preference
cycle which is (S, µ) dominated and (S, µ′) dominating. This means that µ(s) is
s’s predecessor in the cycle, which is an element of C, which is a contradiction. 
For the second result, assume that |µ(c)| > |µ′(c)| for some college c. Therefore
there exists a student s such that µ(s) = c and µ′(s) 6= c. Since c has responsive
preferences, c would prefer to include s to its matched set µ′(s). Since µ′ is stable,
we must have µ′(s) ≻s c = µ(s). Therefore s and c are part of a preference cycle
which is (S, µ′) dominated, and c is filled at full capacity under µ′ and µ′, which is
a contradiction. .
For the third result, assume that µ(c) 6= µ′(c) for some college c. Let s be the
highest-ranked student from µ(c) ∪ µ′(c) which is matched to c in one of the two
matchings µ, µ′ but not in both. Assume without loss of generality that µ(s) = c.
Since preferences are responsive, in stable matching µ′, c would prefer to include
s, either by replacing its least prefered student in µ′(c) or by adding s to the class
µ′(c) if there is capacity. Since µ′ is stable, s prefers µ′(s) to c. This means that s
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and c are part of a (S, µ′) dominating preference cycle and c is at full capacity in
matching µ′, which implies that c is at full capacity in matching µ, which constitutes
a contradiction. .
Theorem 3.5. (Pathak-Sonmez ’08). Consider the Boston mechanism on S ∪
C, where S is partitioned into two sets, S = N ⊔M , such that the action set of
players in N only contains the truthful strategy and the action set of players in M
contains all strategies of this game, i.e. players in N are sincere and players in
M are sophisticated. Then the college allocation of any sincere student is the same
across all Nash Equilibria of this game.
Proof. First of all, we know from Pathak - Sonmez ’13 that every Nash Equib-
rium of the Boston mechanism is equivalent to a stable matching in the economy
where students have the same preferences as before, and college preferences are
characterized by tiers : all students in a higher tier are preferred to students in
a lower tier, students in the same tier are ranked according to the original pref-
erences of the college, the first tier contains all sophisticated students along with
sincere students who ranked that college as number one, and tier k 6= 1 contains
all sophisticated students who ranked that college as number k.
Assume that a sincere student s gets two different college assignments in dif-
ferent Nash Equilibria. From now on, focus on the preferences of the modified
economy. s has two different college assignments in two stable matchings. Assume
these matchings are µ and µ′ and assume µ′(s) ≻s µ(s). From lemma 3.3, s is part
of a preference cycle that is (S, µ) dominated and (S, µ′) dominating. Since s is
sincere and s prefers its successor c1 in the cycle to its predecessor c, college c does
not have s in its first tier. Since c nevertheless prefers s to c’s predecessor s0, it
must be the case that s0 is in a tier at most as high as s under c’s preferences.
Therefore s0 is also sincere.
Recall that each student’s successor in the preference cycle is its matching under
µ′ and its predecessor is its matching under µ. Consider matching µ. s is matched
to c, but s0 is not matched with c but with s0’s predecessor in the preference cycle,
c0. We know that s0 prefers c to c0, therefore since s0 is sincere, s0 applied to c
first, and got rejected. Since s got matched to c, it must be the case that s applied
to c at least as early as s0 applied to c, which means that s got matched in µ strictly
earlier than s0 got matched in µ.
We just showed that if a student s in this preference cycle is sincere, then its
predecessor’s predecessor, s0, is sincere and matched in µ strictly after s. Iterating
this process, since we are iterating through predecessors in a cycle, we will get back
to s and reach a contradiction: s being matched in µ after itself. Therefore the
initial assumption was false. .
4. Appendix
Here we prove the three lemmas from the paper.
Lemma 2.3. Let µ and µ′ be two stable matchings on M ∪W with µ′(m) ≻m
µ(m) for somem ∈M . Thenm is part of a preference cyclem0w0m1w1 . . .mkwkm0
which is (M,µ) dominated and (M,µ′) dominating.
Proof. Denote m0 = m. Since µ
′(m0) ≻m0 µ(m0), it must be the case that
µ′(m0) ∈ W , and let µ
′(m0) = w0. In matching µ, m0 prefers w0, so it must be
the case that w0 is matched to an agent m1 ∈ M,m1 6= m0, such that w0 prefers
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m1 to m0. But then, in matching µ
′, it must be the case that m1 is matched
to an agent w1 ∈ W , w1 6= w0, such that m1 prefers w1 to w0. Now, consider
that we have continued this process, and take the largest set of distinct agents
m0,m1, . . .mk ∈M and w0, w1, . . . wk such that the following conditions all hold:
(1) µ(mi) = wi−1 and µ
′(mi) = wi for 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
(2) mi prefers its matching in µ
′ to its matching in µ, for 0 ≤ i ≤ k.
(3) wi prefers its matching in µ to its matching in µ
′, for 0 ≤ i < k.
Now consider agent mk in matching µ: it prefers wk to its match wk−1. There-
fore, in µ, agent wk has a match which it prefers to mk.
Assume µ(wk) 6= m0. Then let µ(wk) = mk+1 with mk+1 /∈ {m0,m1, . . . ,mk},
and consider wk in matching µ
′: it prefers mk+1 to mk. Therefore mk+1 must be
matched in µ′ to someone it prefers to wk.
Let µ′(mk+1) = wk+1. Since mk+1 /∈ {m0,m1, . . . ,mk}, we must also have
µ′(mk+1) /∈ {µ
′(m0), µ
′(m1), . . . , µ
′(mk)} = {w0, w1, . . . , wk}. Now notice that
the larger set of agents m0, . . . ,mk,mk+1, w0, . . . , wk, wk+1 also satisfies the three
conditions above. This is a contradiction to our construction. Therefore µ(wk) =
m0, so m0w0m1w1 . . .mkwkm0 is a preference cycle where for every m ∈M in the
cycle, µ(m) is m’s predecessor and µ′(m) is m’s successor, so indeed this cycle is
(M,µ) dominated and (M,µ′) dominating, as desired. 
Lemma 2.6. Let µ and µ′ be two matchings on M ∪W such that µ is stable
and µ′(m) ≻m µ(m) for allm ∈M . Then every agentm ∈M is part of a preference
cycle that is both (M,µ) dominated and (M,µ′) dominating.
Proof. Consider m0 ∈M . Since µ
′(m0) ≻m µ(m) m ∅, we have µ
′(m0) ∈ W .
Let µ′(m0) = w0. Since m prefers m0 to µ(m0) and µ is stable, w0 must be
matched in µ to an agent m1 ∈ M which w0 prefers to m. The argument now is
identical to the one in the proof of the previous lemma: Consider the largest path
m0w0m1w1 . . .mkwkmk+1 of distinct agents alternating between M and W with
the property that each agent wi’s predecessor is µ
′(wi) and its successor is µ(wi),
for 0 ≤ i ≤ k and each agent prefers its successor to its predecessor.
Since µ′(mk+1) ≻mk+1 wk, let µ
′(mk+1) = wk+1 ∈ W . Sincemk+1 /∈ {m0,m1, . . .mk},
we have wk+1 = µ
′(mk+1) /∈ {µ
′(m0), µ
′(m1), . . . µ
′(mk)} = {w0,m1, . . . wk}. In
stable matching µ, mk+1 prefers wk+1 to wk. Therefore wk+1 must be matched
with an agent mk+2 which it prefers to mk+1. If mk+2 /∈ {m0,m1, . . . ,mk+1} then
we have reached a longer path m0w0m1w1 . . .mkwkmk+1wk+1mk+2, which would
be a contradiction. Therefore mk+2 ∈ {m0,m1, . . . ,mk+1}, or equivalently
µ(wk+1) ∈ {m0, µ(w0), µ(w1), . . . , µ(wk)}, which implies that mk+2 = m0, so
indeed m0 is part a preference cycle which is (M,µ) dominated and (M,µ
′) domi-
nating. 
Lemma 3.3. Let µ and µ′ be two stable matchings on S∪C, with µ′(s) ≻s µ(s)
for some s ∈ S. Then s is part of a preference cycle s0c0s1c1 . . . skcks0 which is
(S, µ) dominated, (S, µ′) dominating and all colleges in this cycle are filled at full
capacity in µ and µ′.
Proof. Needs more work!
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